An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Fertility by Ewert \u2700, Michelle Y.
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects International Studies
2000
An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of
Fertility
Michelle Y. Ewert '00
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Ewert '00, Michelle Y., "An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Fertility" (2000). Honors Projects. Paper 1.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/intstu_honproj/1
An Empirical Investigation
 
of the Determinants of Fertility
 
by
 
Michelle Y. Ewert
 
Research paper submitted on April 24, 2000 to fulfill requirements 
of Honors Program under guidance of Dr. Teodora O. Amoloza 
chair, Dr. Haria Ossella-Durbal, Dr. Charles F. Springwood and 
Dr. Michael W. Weis. 
Abstract 
As sociologists and economists evaluate the demographic trends of the past 
century, they note that total fertility rates have fallen worldwide. Using various theories 
to explain demographic change, scholars attribute the fall in fertility rates to a variety of 
social and economic factors. This study evaluates the effect of determinants of fertility 
from three major theories of fertility decline. Using World Bank and United Nations 
data, this study considers the impact of female illiteracy, female labor force participation, 
per capita GNP, urbanization and female secondary education on total fertility rates. 
Linear regression analyses for the years 1970, 1980 and 1990 show female illiteracy to 
have the strongest, most consistent effect on fertility. Urbanization, per capita GNP, 
female labor force participation and female secondary education each demonstrate 
statistical significance for one or two ofthe years tested. 
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Introduction 
The world's natural resources are contained within the confines of a relatively 
small planet. While nature constantly recreates itself in order to maintain a balance of 
life, human activity has seriously compromised the earth's health. First extracting plant 
and animal resources for food and wood for fuel and shelter, humans now use almost 
every resource in some way to meet their consumption demands. In addition to 
expanding the types of resources used, the growing human population has vastly 
increased both the quantity of resources needed to support human life and the amount of 
waste discarded after production and consumption of goods. The environmental strain 
resulting from the growing human population concerns many people. It is often predicted 
that global population growth cannot be sustained far into the future if consumption 
patterns remain at current levels. Therefore, it is imperative that both population growth 
and consumption patterns be studied carefully. 
In the 1991 State o/the World Report, Lester Brown explores the two divergent 
views regarding population growth: the economic approach and the ecological approach 
(1991: 16). Those people who espouse the economic approach view population growth as 
positive. As long as the economic growth rate exceeds the population growth rate, 
growth can be sustained long into the future and serves to improve the standards of 
living. Those who take the ecological stance view population growth negatively. They 
fear that as the population grows and the earth's resources shrink, humans will soon reach 
the earth's carrying capacity. 
An integral part of the debate is the quality of life which the population wishes to 
maintain and the ability of the population to utilize available resources to meet its needs. 
Depending on resources available, one part of the world might be able to sustain a much 
greater concentration of people than another. Many of the fundamental arguments 
decrying population growth have not changed over the centuries. However, many 
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population experts see the need for increased urgency in addressing the population 
dilemma as the population doubling time gets shorter and shorter. 
Often considered to be the father of population study, Thomas Malthus laid the 
foundation for the ecological approach to population growth in his 1798 "An Essay on the 
Principle of Population." Malthus acknowledges that both food and sexual relations are 
necessary to ensure the continuation of human existence. He theorizes that population 
increases geometrically (or exponentially), while the means for subsistence increases 
only arithmetically. He writes "The perpetual tendency in the race of man to increase 
beyond the means of subsistence is one of the general laws of animated nature which we 
can have no reason to expect will change" (Malthus in Menard 1987: I03). Therefore, the 
population must be checked in some way so as not to outgrow available resources. 
Malthus saw both voluntary and involuntary checks to population growth. The voluntary 
checks, also known as preventive checks, involve changes in behavior, either marrying 
late or practicing celibacy. The involuntary checks, also called positive checks, include 
war, famine, disease, and natural disasters brought upon by overuse or scarcity of natural 
resources. While the preventive checks lower the birth rate, the positive checks raise the 
death rate, each limiting population growth (Wrong 1964: 101). 
The major criticism of Malthus' theory is that he did not foresee the dramatic 
increase in output brought upon by the industrial revolution or the opening of new lands 
through colonization. Because he wrote in the late 1700s, he had no way of predicting 
the new sources of energy or improvements in production. His theory does not allow for 
human ability to expand the earth's carrying capacity (Wrong 1964:104). Secondly, 
Malthus did not advocate the use ofbirth control. The only behavior modifications he 
advocated were marrying later in life and practicing celibacy until able to financially 
support children. His belief that humans could reduce fertility rates merely through 
celibacy and delaying marriage seems both umealistic and impractical. 
Paul and Anne Ehrlich have established themselves as the modem leaders of the 
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ecological approach to population growth. In their book Population, Resources, 
Environment, they document the rapid decrease in many countries' doubling times and 
question whether most countries are prepared to double their resources and social 
services over the next few decades (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1970:2). They acknowledge that 
in agricultural societies, children are sources of labor, whereas in industrial societies, 
children are merely consumers. While there is economic pressure, therefore, to decrease 
family size as industrialization occurs, such decreases in fertility might not occur rapidly 
enough. The concem with overpopulation is not merely density in relation to land, but 
density in relation to resources, an important indicator of living standards (Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich 1970:200). They write: 
"Although human beings are capable of adapting themselves to a wide variety of 
environments, it is plain that we do much better in some sets of circumstances 
than others. Whether we measure adaptive success by how many individuals can 
survive in a given area or by how many can live healthy, productive, reasonably 
happy, and comfortable lives is a vitally important point." 
(Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1970:207) 
Thus, they acknowledge that while the earth might be able to sustain high levels 
of population growth, the quality ofhuman life would be seriously compromised. 
Julian Simon, renowned economist, takes a much more optimistic approach to 
population growth. Because population growth results from advances in technology or 
health, growth is an indicator of increased living standards. He states that"...population 
growth represents economic success and human triumph" (Simon in Menard 1987: 124). 
Simon argues that population growth often leads to economic growth. A larger labor 
force provides a wider pool of skills for employers, promotes the economies of scale, and 
increases the demand for goods. While he does acknowledge that certain problems arise 
from rapid population growth, the benefits far outweigh the negative consequences. He 
states, 
"Adding more people causes problems, but people are also the means to solve 
these problems...The ultimate resource is people--skilled, spirited, and hopeful 
people--who will exert their wills and imaginations for their own benefit, and so, 
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invariably, for the benefit of us all" (Simon in Menard 1987: 128). 
Thus, limiting population growth would deprive society of many talents and 
contributions. Simon's optimism seems a bit naive, however. He is often criticized for 
placing too much hope in technological advancements which might or might not take 
place. 
Economists and ecologists will probably continue the debate on population and 
economic growth long into the future, each using different studies to support their 
position. Studies on population growth inevitably focus on fertility rates. While a large 
population has more momentum for growth than a smaller one, the fertility rates 
ultimately detenuine the amount of growth that will occur. Garrett Hardin uses the 
concept of the "tragedy of the commons" to illustrate the concern over fertility rates.' 
Using this analogy, if everyone exercises their "right" to bear large numbers of children, 
eventually the population will no longer be able to maintain a high standard of living. 
Hardin writes: 
"If each human family were dependent only on its own resources; if the children 
of improvident parents starved to death; if, thus, overbreeding brought its own 
'punishment' to the genu line--then there would be no public interest in 
controlling the breeding of families. But our society is deeply committed to the' 
welfare state, and hence is confronted with another aspect of the tragedy of the 
commons" (Hardin in Menard 1987:109). 
Already, the "commons" of food gathering and waste disposal have been replaced 
with legal regulation to protect our resources (Hardin in Menard 1987: Ill). It is not such 
a leap to imagine a time when fertility will also be regulated to control growth, as is 
currently being done in China. 
This paper presents a systematic study of population growth and fertility. It first 
examines the history of world population growth and then reviews several major theories 
lIn William Forster Lloyd's famous illustration, all herdsmen of a village are allowed to 
keep their cattle in the common area. Each will try to keep as many cattle as possible 
because, while overgrazing compromises the commons as a whole, the individual incurs 
only a fraction of the cost of overgrazing. As everyone acts in their own self interest, the 
common resources are destroyed and the whole community suffers (Hardin in Menard 
1987: 108). 
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on fertility, highlighting the socioeconomic factors to which the decline is attributed. 
Several of these factors will then be used to develop an empirical model for the 
determinants of fertility. 
Literature Review 
History of Population Growth 
The historical study of population growth is not exact. Estimates of population 
size prior to the l600s are based largely on the projection of census figures for 
agIicultural societies and the examination of archeological remains (Ehrlich and 
Ehrlich 1970: 6). Demographers often emphasize three major technological revolutions in 
human history: the food producing revolution, the urban revolution, and the industrial 
revolution (Wrong 1964: 10). Each technological revolution is marked by an increase in 
the slope of the population curve. For thousands of years, humans existed in nomadic 
bands, engaging in hunting and gathering as means of survival. Most likely, early 
humans had moderate to high birth and death rates, slow population growth, and low 
population density (Menard 1987: 10). With little protection from weather or disease, 
birth rates had to be high to compensate for high death rates (Sax 1960:29). 
As humans gained a greater understanding of the environment, they began 
practicing a primitive form of agriculture, perhaps watering dry plants and replanting the 
tops of yams and other tubers. Around 10,000 to 8000 BCE, more sophisticated forms of 
agriculture and animal domestication evolved (Wrong 1964: 10). The more constant 
food supply resulted in a marked increase in population growth. 
The urban revolution is estimated to have occurred around 4000 BCE. 
Archeological remains dating back to this time indicate that humans settled in cities in the 
Nile Valley and Mesopotamia. The next few thousand years were marked by massive 
demographic upheaval (Menard 1987: 13). As civilizations grew, they expanded 
outward. This exploration and colonization of new lands brought peoples into contact 
with each other, frequently resulting in war and the spread of disease. Prior to the 
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Industrial Revolution, the human population grew in times of economic prosperity and 
political stability and declined as a result of war, disease and famine (Menard 1987: 13). 
The Industrial Revolution, occurring in Europe after1750 CE, led to 
unprecedented population growth. Improved living standards, including sanitation and 
medical technology, caused a dramatic fall in the death rate. As the birth rates stayed 
constant, the European population mushroomed (Menard 1987:13). Since the 1700s, 
technology has continued to advance and industrial progress has spread to most parts of 
the world. With life expectancy increasing and death rates falling globally, the world 
population has grown at a remarkable rate. 
As shown in the graph in Appendix 1, the world population did not reach the first 
billion until around 1800 CEo By 1950, the world population had grown to above two 
billion. In the next fifty years, the population more than doubled, reaching six billion in 
2000. This accelerated growth has led to a great deal of interest and concern among 
sociologists, economists and other scholars, who have attempted to explain the rapid 
population growth of the past hundred years and recent decline in fertility rates using 
various economic and social theories. While many theories exist, a few have been 
particularly influential in the field of demography. Each theory points to certain key 
factors in fertility decline, which will be used in this paper to create an empirical model 
of the determinants of fertility. 
Theories on Population Growth and Fertility 
Demographic Transition Theory: The demographic transition theory attempts to explain 
the extreme population growth of the past few hundred years by mapping the birth and 
death rates and the trend towards replacement level fertility. The theory is based on the 
experiences of 19th century Europe and the observation that mortality rates tend to 
respond more rapidly than birth rates to improvements in living conditions (Teitelbaum in 
Menard 1987: 29). There are three basic stages to the theory. In Stage One, both birth 
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and death rates are high. Because both are high, there is very little growth and population 
size remains stable. Most of human existence was spent in Stage One. With 
industrialization and the accompanying improvements in living conditions, nutrition and 
health practices, the death rate begins to fall, marking Stage Two. The birth rate, 
however, remains high. Because more children live to their reproductive years, there is 
dramatic population growth. After some time, the birth rate also begins to fall, until it 
reaches almost the level of the death rate. At the end of Stage Three, the population once 
again reaches replacement level fertility and population growth slows (Wrong 1964: 15). 
(See the graph in Appendix 2 for an illustration of the demographic transition theory.) 
The demographic transition theory can easily be applied to Western Europe and 
the United States. However, it is unclear if it can be as effectively applied to the rest of 
the world. In Western Europe, advances in agriculture in the 1700s increased production, 
decreasing the number of workers needed in the rural sector. The excess rural workers 
were able to move over to industry, allowing for the rapid development of the industrial 
sector. The resulting advances in communication and transportation facilitated travel. 
During the Industrial Revolution, many excess workers emigrated to the United States, . 
Latin America, or Australia, relieving some of the population pressure in Europe. 
Additionally, the spread ofpopulation and subsequent colonization of new lands provided 
much-needed natural resources and markets for new products. As modern medicine 
decreased the death rate and increased life expectancy, modern birth control also began to 
reduce the birth rate, until the population stabilized (Sax 1960:43). 
The birth and death rates in Western Europe seemed to naturally reach 
equilibrium after completing the demographic transition. It is not so certain that today's 
developing countries will arrive at equilibrium naturally before growing to sizes which 
are beyond the means of their resources. There are several important differences between 
the experiences of Western Europe and today's developing countries. First, the death rate 
in Europe declined gradually because technology, particularly medical technology, was in 
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the early stages of development. With the phenomenal medical advances of the past 
hundred years, the death rates in developing countries have fallen much more rapidly, 
resulting in higher growth rates than in Europe. The fertility levels in developing 
countries today are higher than in Western Europe in the 1700s and 1800s, so the birth 
rates have farther to fall to approach the lower death rates. While Western Europe was 
able to relieve population pressure through emigration, there are no "new lands" left for 
the developing countries to colonize. Even more frustrating, once today's developing 
countries do achieve replacement level fertility, there will still be great momentum for 
further growth because of the very young age structure (Teitelbaum in Menard 1987: 32). 
Certain factors, however, favor a smooth transition for developing countries. 
Modem birth control is much safer and more effective than that available to 19th century 
Europe. It is no longer so culturally unacceptable to have small families, so the social 
pressure to have many children has lessened. Similarly, national leaders are very 
concerned with the implications of population growth so are taking a more active role in 
population planning. Many developing countries also have much more advanced social 
and physical infrastructure than those of 19th century Western Europe (Teitelbaum in 
Menard 1987: 33). The fact remains, however, that today's developing countries are 
growing at a faster rate than Western Europe during its demographic transition. 
The demographic transition theory points to several key determinants of fertility, 
the most important being industrialization. While it is difficult to find a single measure 
of industrialization, there are many measures which serve as good indicators. The first is 
the country's level of urbanization. A highly industrialized country is likely to have a 
large percentage of its population living in urban areas. Also, industrialized countries 
derive large percentages of their gross national product (GNP) from the secondary and 
tertiary sectors of the economy. GNP is often broken down to indicate the percentages 
that come from agriculture, manufacturing and services. In addition to economic 
indicators, standard of living is also measured by health and education. The Human 
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Development Index value, a composite of economic, health and education variables, 
attempts to encompass most aspects of life. Statistics looking at specific aspects of health 
or education, such as availability of inununization or gender ratios in higher education, 
are also useful. Unfortunately, statistics relating to education and health are not always 
gathered as regularly or reported as widely as economic statistics. 
Wealth Flow Theory: John Caldwell attributes the transition towards a lower fertility rate 
to the changing economic value of children. In sununarizing the wealth flow theory, he 
contends that the economic value of children is "progressively undermined by 
urbanization, compulsory schooling, legislation restricting the exploitation of minors, and 
the kind of employment available in an advanced industrial system" (Caldwell 1999:479). 
In advanced industrial societies, the intergenerational flow of wealth runs from parents to 
children, whereas in rural conununities in less developed countries, wealth flows from 
children to their parents. Children in pre-industrial societies are often a valuable source 
of labor and can be considered an economic investment. In less developed countries, 
agriculture is very labor-intensive. While it would be expensive to hire workers to 
perform the necessary farm tasks, it is relatively less expensive to use the labor of one's 
children. Children's contributions to family income may be quite significant. 
Additionally, children may care for their parents in their old age and serve as a form of 
social security. Therefore, large families are economically rational (Caldwell in Bulatao 
et al 1983 :469). 
As industrialization and development occur and living standards improve, the cost 
of raising children increases. Because children in industrial countries are often required 
to attend school for a set period of time, they are no longer able to work and contribute to 
the family income. Additionally, higher levels of consumption of other goods and 
services make each child more expensive to raise than in pre-industrial societies. 
Another important consideration is the opportunity cost of women caring for children 
instead of participating in the labor force (Easterlin 1996: 110). Child-rearing, while 
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perhaps emotionally satisfying, offers no economic compensation for the potential hours 
of work lost (Hess 1988: 14). Because children simultaneously become more expensive 
to raise and contribute less to the family income, the demand for children decreases. As 
countries industrialize, Caldwell predicts that the demand for children, and therefore 
overall fertility, will naturally decrease. 
The most important variables in the wealth flow theory involve the value of 
children, family structure and level of consumption. It is difficult to assign a value to 
family type. Simply stating the number of people in a particular family does not indicate 
whether the family unit includes only the nuclear unit or also the extended family. 
Measuring the economic value of children is slightly easier. Although it would be 
virtually impossible to measure the number of children employed in the informal sector, 
data is available that documents the number of children in the formal workforce. School 
enrollment statistics are also useful, although such statistics are not always accurate 
because children enrolled in school might not attend regularly. Measuring levels of 
consumption is more problematic since most countries have very bipolar societies. Per 
capita GNP, while demonstrating potential spread of wealth, does not account for the 
extreme inequality in resource distribution. 
Relative Income Theory: Richard Easterlin theorized that there are two important 
economic factors in the decision to marry and have children: the couple's potential 
earning power and their desired standard of living (Easterlin 1980:39). The potential 
earning power is determined by the job market and the couple's job skills. The desired 
standard ofliving, sometimes called "material aspirations," is a combination of family 
upbringing, available consumer goods, and personal values. Because the minimum 
consumption level for which a young couple strives is usually that of their parents at the 
time the couple left home, the material aspirations tend to increase with each passing 
generation (Kohl 1984:29). 
Easterlin postulates that income is relative. What might be considered a high 
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income for one person might be low for another, depending on the type of lifestyle one 
wishes to lead. Relative income is calculated by dividing the earning power by material 
aspirations (Easterlin 1980:42). As relative incomes rise, reflecting a greater increase in 
earning power than material aspirations, couples will be able to maintain a high standard 
of living for a greater number of children and will likely increase family size. As relative 
incomes fall, reflecting difficulty in maintaining a desired standard of living, fertility will 
likely fall (Easterlin 1980:43). Although absolute incomes have risen over the years, 
increased consumerism in much of the world has limited the rise in relative income, thus 
leading to the decrease in fertility. 
The relative income theory attributes changes in fertility to the job market and 
level of consumption. Employment statistics for men and women are readily available, 
although they do not always indicate the type of employment opportunities or prospective 
wages likely to be earned. As stated earlier, consumption levels are difficult to measure, 
although per capita GNP is often used to show a country's potential affluence. 
Proposed Empirical Determinants of Fertility 
When measuring changes in population size, one must consider the crude birth 
rate, crude death rate and net migration. The crude birth rate (CBR) refers to the number 
of live births per thousand members of the population in a given year. The crude death 
rate (CDR) gives the number of deaths per thousand members of the population in a year. 
Net migration is calculated by subtracting the number of people leaving the country from 
the number of people entering over the span of a year. These statistics are recalculated 
annually. 
When evaluating demographic trends, it is often more useful to work with fertility 
rates than the crude birth rate. Because the crude birth rate measures the number of births 
per thousand members of the population as a whole, it does not give a clear indication of 
increases or decreases in average family size or the number of children a woman is likely 
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to bear over the course of her life, important considerations when studying changes in 
population growth. 
The total fertility rate (TFR) is one of the most useful tools for evaluating 
demographic trends. The TFR measures the average number of children a hypothetical 
woman in a population is likely to bear over the course of her reproductive years. For 
statistical purposes, the reproductive years last from age fifteen to forty-nine. It should 
be noted that this number is always significantly lower than the level of fecundity, the 
maximum number of children a woman would bear if she engaged in regular sexual 
intercourse throughout her reproductive years without using any form of birth control. 
The lower level of fertility than fecundity is due to a variety of biological, 
ecological, social, political and economic factors. People have a significant degree of 
control over their fertility and will choose to bear the number of children which is most 
beneficial to them. The decision regarding family size, then, is a combination of 
microlevel and macrolevel factors. 
In the mid-1950s, Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake outlined a framework of direct 
and indirect determinants of fertility which are classified as intercourse variables, 
contraception variables, and gestation or parturition variables (Davis and Blake 
1956:211). Intercourse variables include the age of first sexual unions, the proportion of 
women remaining celibate, the reproductive period between sexual unions, voluntary and 
involuntary abstinence within unions, and the frequency of intercourse. Contraception 
variables include voluntary and involuntary fecundity or infecundity and the use or 
nonuse of contraception. Gestation variables refer to involuntary or induced fetal 
mortality. Each variable is assigned a value according to its affect on fertility. 
Davis and Blake write that "In general, the pre-industrial societies have high 
fertility-values for those variables farthest removed from the actual moment of parturition 
and which, therefore, imply an overall outlook favorable to fertility" (Davis and Blake 
1956:234). Because many pre-industrial societies practice early, universal marriage and 
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use little contraception, the probability that women will become pregnant many times 
during their reproductive years is high. Industrial societies have successfully lowered 
their fertility rates not by targeting all variables, but by focusing on a few important ones. 
Specifically, industrial societies are generally marked by delayed marriage and 
widespread contraception use (Davis and Blake 1956:235). 
John Bongaarts later took this framework and used it to create an equation for the 
fertility-inhibiting effects of key direct determinants, evaluating the TFR as a function of 
marriage, lactational infecundity, abortion, pathological sterility, contraception 
prevalence, and total fecundity (Stover 1998:255). This formula has been used 
extensively to evaluate changes in fertility. 
Instead of focusing on the physical and biological determinants of fertility, this 
paper explores at the macrolevel the way certain social and economic factors affect 
fertility. This study investigates the effect of female literacy, female participation in 
secondary education, female workforce participation, the country's level ofurbanization 
and per capita gross national product on fertility rates. As deduced from earlier 
discussions of the wealth flow theory, relative income theory and demographic transition 
theory, these variables are believed to have an impact on fertility. 
Female literacy is measured using the female illiteracy rate. The female illiteracy 
rate is the percentage of females age fifteen and older that cannot read or write a simple 
sentence about their everyday life. Female labor force participation is measured by the 
percentage of the labor force that is female. The labor force includes all people between 
the ages of fifteen and sixty-five who meet the International Labor Organization's 
definition of the economically active population. The "economically active population" 
refers to all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services, generally 
including the armed forces, the formal sector and those who are unemployed. 
Homemakers, unpaid caregivers and people employed in the informal sector are not 
included. 'While data on the percentage of females employed would have been more 
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useful, complete sets of such data were hard to find. Urbanization is measured by the 
percentage of the country's population that lives in an urban area, as reported to the 
United Nations. Per capita GNP is calculated by dividing GNP by the midyear 
population. In order to adjust for inflation, per capita GNP is given in constant 1995 
$US, making comparisons through time possible. Female participation in secondary 
education, specifically general education, programs is calculated by determining the 
percentage of students enrolled in these programs who are female. 
Methodology 
The data used in this study come from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM and the United Nations' Wistat CD (Women's Indicators and 
Statistics Database). These CDs are a compilation of the data sets included in each 
organization's yearly publications. The World Development Indicators CD contains 
more than five hundred economic and social timeseries indicators from 1960 to 1997. 
The Wistat CD contains over fifteen hundred statistical series on most aspects of life for 
both men and women in over two hundred countries or areas of the world. The data run 
from 1970 to 1993, with some series projected into the future. The per capita GNP, 
female illiteracy, urbanization, and female labor force participation statistics were taken 
from the World Development Indicators CD. Statistics for female enrollment in 
secondary education were found in the Wistat CD. Data for each variable were compiled 
for the years 1970, 1980 and 1990. These years were chosen because, being census 
years, more countries had complete data sets available. 
Complete data for all census years were available for fifty-seven countries. The 
sample includes mostly developing countries and some more developed countries. 
According to the Population Reference Bureau's classifications, twenty-six of the 
countries are African, fourteen are Asian, twelve are Latin American or Caribbean, four 
are European and one is Oceanian. While it is useful to look at regional statistics, there is 
great variation within each regional bloc. Both Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa are 
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classified as "African," yet are vastly different. If the two African regions are considered 
separately, Northern Africa's per capita GNP is twice as high as that of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, its population is significantly more urban, more women use modem 
contraception, life expectancy is fifteen years longer, and the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 
is almost fifty percent lower (1999 World Population Data Sheet). Similar disparities 
exist in Latin America and Asia, although these regions generally have much more 
favorable life expectancies, IMRs, and contraception prevalence than Africa as a whole. 
Asia is still, however, very rural. Europe and Oceania, being more industrialized, have 
much longer life expectancies, higher per capita GNPs, larger percentages of their 
populations living in urban areas, and better health conditions than most of the 
developing world. Nevertheless, these fifty-seven countries show wide variation in 
fertility rates and the other identified variables. It is thus necessary to do a systematic 
analysis of the impact of these variables on fertility. 
The following regression model shows the proposed relationship between female 
illiteracy, female secondary education, female participation in the labor force, 
urbanization, per capita GNP and fertility: 
TFR= a + blper capita GNP + b)llit + b
3
Labor + b
4
Urban + bjSecEd 
According to this model, the total fertility rate (TFR) is a function of five variables and a 
theoretical constant. The b-value indicates how much the TFR would change due to a 
one-unit change of that particular variable, all other variables held constant. For 
example, bl indicates how much the TFR would change ifper capita GNP increased by 
one dollar, holding the levels of the other variables constant. The other b-values indicate 
the amount by which TFR would change if each respective variable were increased by 
one percentage point, assuming the levels of the other variables did not change. 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
The data were first organized according to geographic region for descriptive 
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analysis. The mean, standard deviation and range were taken for each variable to show 
regional and global trends over the twenty year period. Results are shown in Appendix 
3.1 to 3.5. Overall, the total fertility rate fell by 1.56, from 5.86 in 1970 to 4.3 in 1990. 
The European and African TFRs fell slightly, while the Asian and Latin American TFRs 
fell dramatically. The 1990 African TFR (5.63) is still almost twice as high as that of the 
other regions of the world, with the Asian and Latin American TFRs (3.31 and 3.62 
respectively) halfway between those of Africa and Europe (1.46). 
The overall average per capita GNP grew by only two hundred dollars over the 
twenty year period. Africa's mean per capita GNP ($774.9 in 1990) grew by fifty 
percent, but is still abysmally low when compared with every other region of the world. 
Europe was the only region that experienced significant economic growth, with its per 
capita GNP now above eleven thousand dollars. 
The female illiteracy rate fell twenty percentage points in Africa (80% to 60%) 
and Asia (55% to 34%). Initially much lower than in other parts of the world, Europe's 
and Latin America's female illiteracy rates fell by only seven to eleven percentage points. 
The female illiteracy rate in Africa is still much higher than the global average (41 % in 
1990), with well over half the female population unable to read and write. 
Female labor force participation remained fairly constant between 1970 and 1990 
(over 30%). Europe and Latin America experienced the greatest growth, adding slightly 
under ten percentage points to the percentage of labor force that is female. Africa is still 
the region with the highest percentage of the labor force comprised of females (40%). 
Each region experienced an increase of approximately ten percentage points in 
urbanization. Europe has the highest level of urbanization (66%) and Africa has the 
lowest (32%). The overall mean is around forty-five percent, with just under half the 
global population living in urban areas. 
The percentage of students enrolled in secondary education who are female grew 
globally by roughly seven percentage points between 1970 and 1990 (from 37% to 44%). 
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Africa and Asia experienced the most significant growth. Europe and Latin America 
initially had a more equal ratio so their percentages grew only slightly. 
Regression Analysis 
For each year, the regression model was fitted to the data set. Results of the 
regression analyses are given in Table I. 
Table I.Regression coefficients for the different determinants of fertility, 1970, 
1980 and 1990 for n=57 countries. 
Variable 
Per capita GNP 
(GNP) 
Female illiteracy 
(llllT) 
Female labor force 
participation (LABOR) 
Urbanization 
(URBAN) 
Female secondary 
education (SECED) 
ns not significant 
1970 Coefficients 
0.00003304 
p<.1l4 ns 
0.02951 
p<.OOI *** 
-0.02791 
p<.061 * 
-0.02917 
p<.OOI *** 
-0.005585 
p<.797 ns 
1980Coefficients 
0.00003408 
p<.204 ns 
0.05502 
p<.OOO *** 
-0.02193 
p<.147 ns 
-0.03352 
p<.OOO *** 
0.04787 
p<.056 * 
1990 Coefficients 
-0.00007607 
p<.060 * 
0.04292
 
p<.OOO ***
 
0.01844
 
p<.297 ns
 
-0.005583 
p<.576 ns 
0.01925
 
p<.476 ns
 
* significant at 10% level 
*** significant at I% level 
Female illiteracy, female labor force participation and urbanization were found to 
have a significant impact on fertility in 1970. Female illiteracy and urbanization were 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In 1980, female illiteracy and urbanization were 
once again highly significant. Instead of labor force participation, however, female 
secondary education was shown to impact fertility. In 1990, only female illiteracy and 
per capita GNP were statistically significant. 
Scatter diagrams showing the relationship between fertility and the variables that 
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have a significant effect on fertility are located in Appendix 4.1 to 4.8. The diagrams 
show a strong positive relationship between fertility and female illiteracy and negative 
relationships between fertility and per capita GNP, female labor force participation and 
urbanization. Surprisingly, for the year in which female secondary education was shown 
to be statistically significant, it exhibited a positive relationship with total fertility rate. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Female educational opportunities are both direct and indirect determinants of 
fertility. In societies where a large percentage of the female population attends school 
beyond the primary years, education serves to delay marriage and postpone childbearing 
(Hess 1988: 19). Education also increases knowledge of health, hygiene, nutrition, and 
childcare. Ifparents are better able to care for their children's physical needs, more 
children will survive to adulthood. Thus, parents will need to have fewer children to 
ensure their optimal family size. Finally, education increases women's job skills. While 
education does not guarantee access to jobs in all societies, it generally increases 
women's earning power, making family care less attractive (Easterlin and Crimmins 
1985:22). As an indirect determinant, education makes women more aware of 
opportunities for community involvement outside the home, decreasing the amount of 
time women are willing to spend caring for homes and families. 
Data gathered in the mid-1970s for the World Fertility Survey (WFS) show an 
overall negative relationship between education and fertility (Kasarda, Billy and West 
1986:89). For the most part, the expected number of children in developed countries 
declined in an L-shaped curve as education increased, although a few countries' curves 
appeared slightly V-shaped. Similarly, WFS data from developing countries also 
indicated an inverse relationship between education and fertility. However, this 
relationship is strongest when education increases to include secondary education or 
higher. As a direct determinant of fertility, a few years of primary education will reduce 
the length of breastfeeding, and thus the period oflactational amenorrhea, without 
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substantially changing other determinants of fertility related to education (Kasarda, Billy, 
and West 1986:92). 
It is surprising, then, that this study found female secondary education to have 
only a small, positive impact on fertility. Literacy, however, proved to be the strongest 
determinant, showing significant effect at the highest level each year tested. It is possible 
that secondary education is better classified as an indirect determinant of fertility and that 
the effect of education on fertility is mediated by literacy. Literacy logically increases 
job skills and broadens the range ofjobs able to be completed. Literacy determines a 
woman's ability to read and absorb written information regarding health, nutrition and 
sanitation. 
Basic literacy can be achieved through primary education, however. To test 
education as a direct detenninant of fertility, it might be better to use tertiary education 
instead of secondary. Certainly, secondary education impacts a variety of social, 
economic and demographic variables which directly affect fertility, such as employment, 
age at marriage and knowledge of contraception (Kasarda, Billy and West 1986:94). 
However, tertiary education necessitates a longer delay in marriage and childbearing so 
might have a more significant direct impact. Either way, education of women is one of 
the most important institutional variables for reducing fertility because it can easily be 
affected by public policy. 
Female participation in the labor force is generally believed to lower fertility. 
WFS data show that in developed countries, there is a strong negative relationship 
between employment and childbearing. Findings for less developed countries, however, 
are inconsistent. Some studies conclude that there is a definite inverse relationship. 
Others are inconclusive or even suggest a slight positive one (Kasarda, Billy and West 
1986: 112). The inconsistencies in the findings are due, in part, to the way in which 
employment is defined. If employment includes agricultural work or cottage industry, 
much of the female population in developing countries would be considered to be 
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employed. If employment were limited to work done outside of the home, fewer women 
would be considered to be active in the work force. Because fertility rates tend to be 
higher in rural societies, studies which include agricultural work as a form of 
employment would obviously not show a negative relationship between labor force 
participation and fertility (Kasarda, Billy and West 1986: 113). It could, therefore, be 
argued that the negative relationship between employment and fertility does not appear 
until industrialization occurs. 
Given the inconsistencies regarding the effect of labor force participation on 
fertility, it is not surprising that the effect of female labor force participation was 
significant in only one of the three years tested, and then at only the ten percent level. 
The coefficient was negative, however, indicating a negative relationship between labor 
force participation and fertility. While the ILO does try to maintain some level of 
consistency in who is included in employment statistics, many countries have skewed 
data because they might count seasonal or migrant workers or part-time workers 
differently. Additionally, some countries include cottage industry and other activities in 
employment statistics. Clearly, inconsistencies in measurements weaken any 
generalizations about labor force involvement. 
According to the demographic transition theory, industrialization, generally 
marked by an increase in both urbanization and per capita GNP, is accompanied by a 
decline in fertility. This study found urbanization to be a highly significant negative 
determinant in both 1970 and 1980. The significant impact of per capita GNP was 
evident only in 1990. 
Industrialization is often accompanied by fertility decline. Since urbanization is 
one feature of industrialization, it is logical to assume that urbanization would directly 
impact fertility. In order for industrialization to occur, there must usually be a large rural 
to urban migration. Because food and shelter are often more expensive in urban areas, 
children "cost" more yet usually contribute less to family income (Easterlin and 
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Crimmins 1985:23). Additionally, it is generally more difficult for women to care for 
children while maintaining urban employment than to care for children while engaged in 
farmwork (Hess 1988:21). Urbanization, with increased pressures of cost and space, 
does not accommodate large families easily so demand for children should naturally 
decrease as societies urbanize. 
Rising GNP is the other main indicator of industrialization. It should be noted 
that per capita GNP was significant only in the year in which urbanization was not 
significant. It is possible that economic growth is the real direct determinant of fertility 
and that its impact was captured by urbanization in 1970 and 1980 and by GNP in 1990. 
This study found female illiteracy, female labor force participation and 
urbanization to have significant impact on fertility. If policy-makers were to use this 
model when implementing policies to reduce fertility, they would emphasize these areas. 
However, it is not realistic to expect a policy favoring urbanization to be a long-run 
solution to high fertility, particularly since it was not a significant determinant in 1990. 
Unless dramatic changes in agriculture and production take place, a certain portion of the 
population must always be employed in the agricultural sector. Societies will therefore 
have a limit on the level of urbanization that they can sustain. Instead, governments 
should focus on economic growth as a deterrent to high fertility. 
Illiteracy should be significantly easier to address through public policy. 
Illiteracy can be greatly reduced through improved education. Many countries have 
compulsory schooling laws. Additionally, the government can legislate that boys and 
girls be given equal educational opportunities. Similarly, adult literacy programs 
sponsored by government ministries or departments can target both men and women. 
While such programs do require a significant investment in the educational system, once 
implemented, they should be relatively easy to maintain. If leaders are truly serious 
about reducing fertility, they must channel resources to the education and literacy of 
women. As shown in this study, female literacy has the strongest and most consistence 
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impact on fertility. 
Education and the level of female literacy influence the level and type of female 
labor force participation. If males and females are taught the same curriculum and 
allowed to participate in the same academic activities, they will cultivate comparable 
skills, making them competitive for the same jobs. However, labor force participation is 
not determined solely by skills. If religious or cultural values discourage women from 
working outside the home, even qualified women will not be as likely to seek outside 
employment. While government can legislate anti-discrimination laws in job training and 
hiring, it cannot necessarily change underlying societal values. Thus, policy efforts to 
increase labor force participation might have mixed results. 
A variety of factors other than those included in this study affect fertility. 
Religious and cultural values influence desired family size and attitudes regarding 
fertility control. Ability to limit family size to a desired number is largely dependent on 
the availability of contraception. Health and sanitation impact the number of children 
women can bear to term. In addition to studying these determinants, future studies could 
investigate the effect of female political participation or tertiary education on fertility. If 
more specific statistics were found, studies could compare the effects of participation in 
the primary, secondary and tertiary economic sectors on fertility. While this study 
focused on macrolevel determinants, microlevel factors should not be ignored. Also, it is 
important to evaluate the existing programs which target fertility to determine which have 
been effective and can be replicated in other areas. 
At the personal level, fertility is ultimately determined by choice. If a wide range 
of social and economic options are available to women, they will choose the number of 
children which best fits their lifestyle. If limits are placed on women's ability to make 
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economic and social decisions, however, women will have little input in decisions 
regarding family size and society at large will be compromised. Most people 
acknowledge that population growth is a serious concern. If it is to be treated as such, 
women must be actively involved in the discussion and implementation of potential 
solutions. 
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Appendix 1. World Population Growth Through History. 
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Appendix 2. The Demographic Transition. 
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Appendix 3.2 Descriptive statistics for African countries. 
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Appendix 3.3 Descriptive statistics for Asian countries. 
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Appendix 3.4 Descriptive statistics for European countries. 
Europe standard standard standard 
-- . -
-
-_. ------ -- . - -
-
-- -- - -
_. - ----
-- - - -
-
-- - -- --
-_. - ---- -- - - -
­
per capita 7020.99 3411.53 10,815.71­ 9665,09 4327.94 14,654.25­ 11603.7 5543.54 17,890.51­
GNP 2649.71 4126.48 4645.86 
Female 11.04 8.38 21.9­ 7.33 5.52 14.4­ 4.33 2.96 7.9­
Illiteracy 2.3 1.5 1.1 
Labor Force 29.6 7.01 39.8­ 33.1 7.17 43.3­ 37.68 4.3 44­
Participation 24.4 27.9 34.6 
Urbanization 57.84 8.64 66.04­ 63.51 7.61 72.97­ 65.73 7.19 75.35­
48.52 56.86 58.8 
Secondary 52.06 10.06 66.92­ 53.5 7.77 65­ 54.25 7.85 66­
Education 45.67 48 50 
Total Fertility 2.39 0.36 2.84­ 2 0.28 2.22­ 1.46 0.26 1.84­
Rate 1.97 1.64 1.26 
European countries included in study: Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain
 
Appendix 3.5 Descriptive statistics for Latin American and Caribbean countries.
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Appendix 4.1 Scatter diagram for 1970 female illiteracy and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.2 Scatter diagram for 1980 female illiteracy and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.3 Scatter diagram for 1990 female illiteracy and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.4 Scatter diagram for 1970 female labor force participation and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.5 Scatter diagram for 1970 urbanization and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.6 Scatter diagram for 1980 urbanization and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.7 Scatter diagram for 1980 female secondary education and TFR data. 
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Appendix 4.8 Scatter diagram for 1990 per capita GNP and TFR data. 
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